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There are few philosophers of education who would not bemoan the dominant aspects of 
educational culture which prioritise abstract educational outcomes over educational 
experience. For Tyson E. Lewis the counter to this is Giorgio Agamben’s theory of ‘study’. 
However, ‘study’ is not only a challenge to this very specific manifestation of instrumental 
education but also to ‘learning’ more generally. He tells us that ‘If learning teaches the 
proper use and meaning of signs and things, then studying, if it is truly distinct from learning 
as an educational activity, must have its own domain, its own methods’ (75). Learning 
becomes the necessary straw man against which Lewis is then able to base his argument. 
Lewis’s conceptualisation of learning, here and elsewhere, is nothing to do with any 
conventionally received notion of learning, which – to use a particularly mundane example -  
the first definition in the OED describes as ‘The action of receiving instruction or acquiring 
knowledge’. Clearly one can acquire knowledge through learning, without that knowledge 
being the ‘proper use and meaning of signs and things’ - much the same as one would do 
through standard definitions of study. Leaving aside this somewhat false dichotomy for the 
moment, what then is it ‘to study’ for Lewis in his reading of Agamben? His first full 
definition of it in his book is: 
 
To study is to care for the indeterminate potentiality of potentiality itself. It is to let 
shine not this or that practice, thing, or sign but rather the potentiality of this or that 
to shine. Studying is therefore not a decision to opt for the nothing of nihilism or the 
wilful production of the self or the shine of the sacred but rather a discovery of the 
conditions for the world, its primordial im-potentiality. To study the lack of 
signification as significant is to dwell in an im-potential realm where potentiality 
appears in its withdrawing from any actualisation of this potentiality. (36) 
 
This definition is introduced as a ‘state of stupification’ (36) which prioritises nothing except 
the ‘silent call of im-potentiality itself’ (36). Lewis gives this state of ‘dwelling’ what seems 
like a quasi-mystical turn when he claims that im-potentiality is ‘the only thing that remains 
when the gods have fled and the world stands in darkness’ (36). Perhaps as if the mind 
could somehow be set free from things, practices and signs - as if im-potentiality (and the 
context built around it) was not itself a complex of signs. Just before this passage he 
explains that: 
 
When studying, the studier experiences a willing openness to the potentiality of the 
world to be and not be simultaneously. The im-potentiality of a world enables the 
world to be experience rather than what it has become, without forcing any 
particular actualization of this im-potentiality. When all ontological differences 
disappear, all that is left is a potentiality without a project or focal practice. (35)  
 
Again, perhaps as if it were possible to escape language, memory, possession and 
occupation. As if it were not necessary to think studying. Even at this early stage of the book 
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there is a sense that Lewis will have a difficult task ahead: in writing a book advocating 
doing nothing except existing in a state of stupification he is explicitly doing the opposite: he 
is teaching us how to study. We later learn that there are very particular things that must be 
learned to prepare oneself for this exalted stupid state and that there is a ‘method’ of the 
studier which is, predictably, opposed to the method of learner: 
 
The method of the learner is to collect signs and things in order to reproduce them 
(always in measurable amounts) as evidence of the potentiality to be or do, whereas 
the method of the studier is to collect signatures in order to get lost, wander, and 
thus experience the im-potentiality to be and not to be, do and not do 
simultaneously. (94) 
 
I don’t think Lewis would hesitate to call the method of the studier a pointless indulgence. 
He repeatedly exhibits what could only be described as a pride in the purposelessness of 
studying. And because studying would not be studying if one learned anything at all from it, 
this pointlessness is active at every level, except in its strange self-prioritisation: it is 
significant that we study but nothing we do while studying can remain significant. Contra 
Lewis, it is certainly possible to argue that the method of studying he advocates would often 
result in learning – and perhaps be considered of particular significance when it does. As 
such, while there is much to be lauded in an advocacy of learning through getting lost and 
wandering (or attending to how one learns when one does so), there seems little to no 
significance in ‘studying’ when learning is (at least in theory) forcibly prohibited as a result.  
If Lewis were to open the idea of study to the possibility of undirected learning it would be 
able to take on the educational dimension which at the moment, in my reading at least, it 
lacks. Study comes across as a paralysed and paralysing concept, quite against Lewis’s 
argument that it opens up and sustains ‘a new notion of freedom’ (35). Rather than setting 
up study as the complete antithesis of learning, there might be much to be gained from 
seeing it as another mode of learning.  
To further understand Lewis’ conception of study  - and why I suggest it would 
benefit from incorporating a broadened but different notion of learning - one must 
familiarise oneself more thoroughly with what he means when he writes about potentiality 
and im-potentiality; themselves terms from Giorgio Agamben’s lexicon. Helpfully Lewis 
outlines Agamben’s terms: 
 
potentiality is not simply a positive capacity, propensity, or capability to achieve 
specific goals through specific courses of action. Rather, potentiality is always 
already accompanied by an equally primordial im-potentiality. When thought 
together, potentiality to be and im-potentiality not to be form a paradoxical 
tautology: the potentiality to be and not to be simultaneously. (38) 
 
To study, then, for Lewis, is to care for the fact that something might or might not be. This 
seems to be the major lesson of the book. To ‘study’ means to not do anything that might 
be significant to you while contemplating that you either can or cannot do – which in itself is 
(somewhat taulogocially) significant. This definition is later expanded (and possibly 
contradicted) to include what Lewis calls (via Gever Tulley) ‘tinkering’ which would be 
‘thought of as a pure means rather than simply a means to another end’ (114).  Even further 
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on, this tinkering is analogised with and as ‘studious play’ (127-130). I would argue that 
tinkering and studious play are the ripest pickings of Lewis’ text, especially convincing when 
he prescrbes for both in the classroom: 
  
…the danger of tinkering should be given a space and time within the child’s 
educational life – even if this means exposing them to the dangers of calamities. 
Tinkering in this sense – with all its fits and starts, its rhythmic suspension – is the 
experience of the transmission and transmissibility let loose from determinate ends, 
plans, and pre-existing measurements that attempt to capture, judge and evaluate 
outcomes. (130) 
 
However, when he goes a step further to state that ‘These children tinker in order to 
experience the sudden appearance of their collective im-potentiality’ (130), the tinkering 
seems a little (at least theoretically) instrumental after all. Equally, is it not possible that 
children would learn through their tinkering? About the things they tinker with? About 
themselves? And about other tinkerers? Perhaps even in such a manner that they might 
reposition themselves in terms of rejecting or changing objective goals and outcomes? 
However, this pathway is blocked for Lewis because of the false dichotomy he draws 
between study and learning. 
The two key examples that Lewis utilises to make his argument via Agamben are 
Herman Melville’s short story ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’ and Occupy Wall Street. Interestingly 
Lewis seems unaware or uninterested in the fact that Bartleby had, in one of the USAs 
major liberal periodicals, The New Republic, become the ‘Patron Saint of Occupy Wall Street’ 
(Martyris 2011). It is possible that there is an in-joke here where Lewis is attempting to give 
the impression that he is an ‘inactive, lazy, or simply apathetic’ researcher. All 
characteristics he assigns to ‘one who studies’ and Bartleby (52). However, even if this 
omission is intentional, its absence seems strange in a context where another easily 
searchable (and much discussed) article described OWS as ‘Bartleby’s Occupation of Wall 
Street’ (Gersen 2011).  
  In attempting to map the political dimensions of study and im-potentiality, leading 
up to his discussion of OWS, Lewis argues that ‘The hesitation of studying – and its rhythmic, 
indeterminate oscillation between profound boredom and inspiration and back again – 
seems to be a radical refusal of the call to be this or that type of political subject with this or 
that agenda and this or that set of specific demands’ (149). This may be an interesting 
elaboration of a relation to the political but the question is: why is what Lewis is describing 
in this context ‘studying’ at all? In any common or garden variety? Isn’t it simply ‘radical 
refusal’? And why does it need the complicated (and perhaps ultimately un-revelatory) logic 
of Agamben’s im-potentiality to support it? One wonders if, while Lewis’s conception of 
learning may be too narrow, his conception of study it too broad. In a briefer and more lucid 
piece on both Bartleby and Occupy Wall Street, Lee Edelman (2013) asks (and answers ‘no’ 
to) the questions: ‘Can literature separate itself from politics without proving itself political? 
Can political discourse escape the overdetermination of the literary?’ (102). In so doing, 
Edelman reads Bartleby not as a character who exemplifies a desirable ontological 
disposition described by a contemporary philosopher (Agamben) but as a character in a 
literary work in its own right, eventually asking if ‘the negativity that prefers not to pledge 
itself to the goal of a new community and declines its positivization in a recognizably 
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political agenda [might] remain faithful, by that very refusal, to what vitalizes politics as 
such?’ (116). While Lewis’ On Study contains many sentiments that also come across in 
Edelman’s article, his reading of Agamben seems to tie him in complicated knots over what, 
in political terms, seems like an incredibly straightforward premise: it is possible to exist 
outside of socially prioritised exigencies, either by ignoring or refusing them. Why this 
rejection of socially prioritised exigencies is labelled ‘study’ is unclear and perhaps also 
unhelpful, particularly given that one might learn techniques of refusal or even learn asocial 
ways of being.  
Alternatively, if we are to take Bartleby’s (and Lewis’s) ‘I’d prefer not to’ seriously 
there is perhaps yet another problem with On Study: the end point of On Study is a place 
where ‘prolonged reflection, observation, and aesthetic creativity’ (140) are given a serious 
and significant value. Lewis then softens Bartleby’s ‘I’d prefer not to’ into a ‘I prefer not to 
judge just yet…’ (140). This seems like a very odd lesson to take from Melville’s short story, 
which of course ends with Bartleby preferring not to eat and dying because of it. Bartleby’s 
‘I’d prefer not to’ is unrelenting and will not be softened and sweetly humanised into 
arguments for ‘prolonged reflection, observation, and aesthetic creativity’ through tinkering 
and studious play. Again, while Lewis possibly goes too far in suggesting that no learning can 
or should occur in studying he, at the same time, goes nowhere near far enough in his 
reading of Bartleby, which he sees as ‘not teaching us what to write, or how to write, but 
rather than we can/cannot write’ (52), seemingly ignoring that Bartleby eventually prefers 
not to do anything that will keep him alive: a rather different ‘lesson’. As Edelman’s reading 
shows, Bartleby’s ‘I’d prefer not to’ is a harsh and self-destructive refusal of human sociality 
which stands for – or teaches – nothing: ‘If it teaches, it teaches us nothing – or, more 
precisely, the place of that nothing, that non, in the politics of the human and, therefore, 
the place of the humanities in the performance of every politics’ (Edelman 2013, 114-115). 
It does not teach us a way of being, certainly not a way of being which could be 
commodified into a ‘method of the studier.’ Lewis seems completely un-phased by the 
problems of moving from the fatal asociality of Bartleby to proclaiming the friendship and 
‘joy’ of the tinkering community (139). For both Lewis and, in his reading, Agamben, the 
studier is at once completely separate from sociality and its exigencies and yet somehow 
able to engage and desirous of engaging in joyous social relations. Perhaps another 
definition of the relationship between potentiality and impotentiality is having your cake 
and eating it too. 
Even though it is mired in complex philosophical discussion, Lewis’s central 
argument could probably be summarised not as ‘I’d prefer not to’ but as: I’d prefer to have 
fun and forget about what I think society wants me to do and be for a short while. The spirit 
of this position is far better represented by Tulley and his ‘tinkering’ than Agamben and his 
‘im-potentiality’. Equally, Tulley’s tinkering doesn’t seem to prohibit learning in the way that 
Lewis seems convinced that ‘study’ must. Finally, the Agamben-inspired reading of Bartleby 
seems to work in direct contra-distinction to the direction that Lewis ultimately takes with 
his argument, especially if one is to take seriously the fact that Bartleby’s behaviour leads 
towards the fatal conclusion of the story. With this in mind, Maurice Blanchot (1986) 
provides a much more convincing reading of Melville’s story than Agamben and Lewis when 
he writes: 
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Bartleby gives up (not that he ever pronounces, or clarifies this renunciation) ever 
saying anything; he gives up the authority to speak. This is abnegation understood as 
the abandonment of the self, the relinquishment of identity, refusal which does not 
cleave to refusal but opens to failure, to the loss of being, to thought. “I will not do 
it” would still have signified an energetic determination, calling forth an equally 
energetic contradiction. “I would prefer not to…” belongs to the infiniteness of 
patience; no dialectical intervention can take hold of such passivity. We have fallen 
out of being, outside where, immobile, proceeding with a slow and even step, 
destroyed men come and go. (17) 
 
These ‘destroyed men’ are clearly not the joyous ‘studiers’ that Lewis wants to be inspired 
through tinkering, which is no doubt a good thing. Bartleby is no role model and no teacher, 
despite perhaps being an ‘educator’ in the broad sense. As, amongst other things, his story 
shows that you can only refuse sociality for a short while if you want to survive. Study, in 
Lewis’s approach, is a luxury that few can afford, especially at the cost of learning. And by 
this I do not only mean learning in terms of certified outcomes but also learning how to 
survive in a world where there is so much not to like and so much we might want to change; 
not least ourselves. 
 
Blanchot, M. 1986. The Writing of the Disaster. Translated by Ann Smock. Lincoln & London: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Edelman, L. 2013. “Occupy Wall Street: ‘Bartleby’ against the Humanities.” History of the 
Present 3(1): 99-118. 
Gersen, H. 2011. “Bartleby’s Occupation of Wall Street.” The Millions. Oct. 11, 2011. 
http://www.themillions.com/2011/10/bartleby%E2%80%99s-occupation-of-wall-
street.html  
Lewis, T. E. 2013. On Study: Giorgio Agamben and educational potentiality. London & New 
York: Routledge. 
Martyris, N. 2011. “A Patron Saint for Occupy Wall Street.” The New Republic. Oct. 15, 2011.  
https://newrepublic.com/article/96276/nina-martyris-ows-and-bartleby-the-scrivener  
 
 
 
 Emile Bojesen 
Education Studies and Modern Liberal Arts, University of Winchester, UK. 
Emile.bojesen@winchester.ac.uk 
 
 
